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The objective of this paper is to examine whether FDI inflows in South & East Asian 
economies posses any barriers which are deterring to attract FDI of their actual potential? 
If so, what are those various set of barriers? These questions are addressed in this study 
using cross section time series data for 17 South and East Asian economies from 1996 to 
2005. We coin the term ‘quality of FDI’ which is a function of higher percapita FDI 
inflows, lower volatility in FDI inflows and higher bilateral investment treaties between 
the host country and rest of the word. We test this against the possible set of barriers, 
including, Socio-economic, Labour, Policy and Institutional barriers using pooled 
regression analysis. In the process, we also check as to how fragile our results are to the 
small but important changes which we bring in the conditioning information set using 
robustness check. Our empirical evidence suggests that all the possible set of barriers 
which we have identified has a negative effect in stimulating the ‘quality of FDI’. There 
is an urgent need for South and East Asian economies to address these set of barriers 
which are acting as stumbling block in not allowing to attract FDI of their actual 
potential. 
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01. Introduction 
 
The 2007 Asian Development Outlook released by Asian Development Bank penciled 
the growth of Asia at 8.3% for 2007. This was higher than the forecasted growth rate of 
7.6%. The outlook pegs the growth rate at 8.2% for 2008. This rapid growth in Asia is led 
by two giants, one from South and other East Asia, viz., India and China. The rate of 
growth of South Asia for 2007 was 8.1% slightly lower from 8.7% in 2005 and 2006, 
while East Asia’s growth rate was 8% for 2007, improving from 7.6% in 2006. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, East Asian economies along with China have 
experienced rapid economic growth rates. Its combined growth from 1981 to 1991 was 
average 6.9%, while from 1992 to 2004 the average growth was 6.5% (ADB Report 
2007). In entire Asia, large chunk of FDI is attracted by South East Asia led by China and 
other five major economies namely, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Viet 
Nam and Philippines. The FDI inflows in East Asian economies surged to over 19 US$ 
billion by 1996. But, the year 1997 saw South-East Asian economic crisis which hit the 
entire East Asian belt very hard. However, the crisis did not seem to drastically affect the 
FDI inflows of South East Asian economies. In a report released by Asian Development 
Bank in 2001 said……. 
 
"……the crisis has not introduced a major discontinuity in FDI 
in the affected countries, apart from a modest decline in inflows 
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. The FDI inflows to the 
five countries - Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
and Thailand - collectively reached US$19.2 billion immediately 
before the crisis, in 1996. They dipped to 16.7 US$ billion in 1998, 
but rebounded to 17.4 US$ billion the following year……." 
 
Many expected that after the crisis, there would be a rollback of various liberalization 
polices related to attracting FDI. Infact, this went other way round as all the countries 
which are affected by the crisis, had engaged in further liberalizating the regulations 
related to attracting FDI and this kept driving the FDI inflows in this region. By 2006, the 
total FDI inflows of South East Asian economies excluding Japan stood at 155 US$ 
billion (calculated from UNCTAD). 
 
On the other hand, the South Asia region
1 led by India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 
and Burma
2 lags much behind the East Asia not only interms of attracting FDI but also 
interms of economic development. Having said that, post 2000 onwards, the performance 
                                                 
1 The South Asian region also includes Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives. However, we could not 
get the some important data for these countries. For example, though we have the data related to FDI and 
other macroeconomic variables, we could not find data related to socioeconomic and labour related 
variables for Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. In the case of Afghanistan, though the data for FDI was 
available, we could not get any other information including basic macroeconomic data. Therefore, we were 
forced by the circumstances to exclude these countries from our study, though we would have really loved 
to include of them. 
2 Technically speaking, Burma actually is seems more as an East Asian economy. However, if looked from 
Geographic perspective, we find that it exactly act as a bridge between South & East Asia. Also, 
historically, it was a part of India under ‘Bharat’. Hence, we have included it under South Asia region.   3
of South Asian economies specially led by India has been impeccable. South Asia as a 
region in 2006 attracted FDI worth 20 US$ billions from just under 3 US$ billion in 2000 
(Bhuhyan W, 2003). All the economies are implementing the economic reforms policies 
consistently which are aimed at integrating their economies with that of world economy. 
Infact past research studies of show that indeed there is a sea change in attitude of South 
Asian economies in attracting FDI (Sahoo P, 2006). The research findings show that 
there is a huge positive affect of increased FDI inflows on economic growth in all these 
countries
3. Many experts agree with these findings and believe that South Asia has 
enormous potential to attract FDI. However, there are various political and institutional 
problems which are acting as hindrances to attract more FDI. Excluding India, all the 
South Asian economies are experiencing political turmoils in the form internal political 
crisis or by civil war. Also, the institutional structures are very weak creating a wide gap 
between the policies and their implementations. Added to this, wide spread corruption 
and poor social and physical infrastructure facilities are acting as major investment 
hurdles in these economies. 
 
From the overall trends during post performs period and post 1999, we see South and 
East Asian economies thriving on increasing level of FDI inflows rises important 
question among researchers: Does FDI inflows in these economies posses any barriers 
which are actually deterring them to attract FDI of their actual potential? If so, what are 
those various sets of barriers which are resulting in discouraging the ‘quality of FDI’? 
Will the South and East Asian economies succumb to these barriers in the years to come?  
 
The issues raised are not new, yet there is very little evidence in the literature with 
specific concentration on South and East Asian economies. This paper is an attempt to fill 
this existing gap in the literature and find relevant answers to these critical questions by 
taking into account 17 important South and East economies which are experiencing raid 
surge in FDI inflows. It, therefore, becomes imperative to address these questions by 
identifying four sets of barriers to attract FDI to their potential levels. They include: 
Socio-economic barriers, Labour related barriers, Policy barriers and Institutional 
barriers. To that end, we first use the value of FDI in the form of percapita FDI inflows, 
followed by volatility and increase in number of investment treaties against our set of 
barriers groups. We also check as to how ‘robust’ and/or ‘fragile’ our results are to the 
small but important changes which we bring in the conditioning information set using 
robustness check.   
 
While section I being a curtain raiser, we kick of with section II which deals with wide 
range of literature survey of the previous studies which are involved in studying the 
barriers to FDI. Section III motivates and explains in detail the methodology and research 
design used for the study. This is followed by the results and estimates explained in 




                                                 
3 This study excludes Burma. It also excludes Bhutan and Maldives. The countries considered are: India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.   4
02. Literature Review 
 
To undertake any discussion regarding the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) for a specific country and to examine the most serious barriers to FDI, such as an 
unstable legal framework, corruption, briberies, and bureaucratic procedures, we must 
outline the difficulties which occurred in the definition of FDI. To be more specific, we 
must consider the legal difficulties that arose in the attempts to define FDI flows, since 
each country viewed FDI flows differently in different time periods.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) resulted from the needs and opportunities present in an 
imperfect market. There appears to be quite a lot of literature analyzing the factors that 
encourage firms and entrepreneurs to invest in a foreign country. Ample literature is also 
available on how to predict the outcome of such an investment and choose the best 
alternative. Despite the difficulties in defining FDI, there are generally accepted 
characteristics of FDI that coincide with the following definitions taken from several 
sources (Bitzenis 2006).  
 
According to IMF:  
“Direct investment is a category of international investment made by a 
resident entity in one economy (direct investor) with the objective of 
establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other 
than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise). ‘Lasting interest’ 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct 
investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the 
direct investor on the management of the direct investment enterprise. 
Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two 
entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among 
affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.” (FDI 
Glossary – IMF/OECD, p.2)  
 
Bitzenis (2006), reviewing the various definitions of FDI, concludes that key features of 
the foreign direct investments are “...investing / acquiring / obtaining a foreign firm or 
asset and influencing / controlling the management operations”. 
 
Bitzenis (2006) argues, not only the practices in defining FDI vary greatly across 
countries (depending on the country, the investment is treated as FDI if there is an equity 
stake in the company acquired larger than 10%, or 20%, or 25%), but even the ownership 
of more than 50% might not allow managerial control in case of specific company’s 
regulations. Hence, as the author claims, not all FDI “aim and lead to control” and the 
level of control differs according to the investor’s expectations. 
 
Through the years, many theorists studied the concept of investing abroad, and foreign 
direct investment in particular. What FDI is cannot be defined in a four-line definition, 
since it involves much more than a simple money transaction which aims at a profit. The 
complications begin with the very first step economists take to measure and compare FDI 
flows among several countries. This is because each country may have different   5
standards for a foreign investment to be considered a direct investment. The Organisation 
for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD) (1997) has recommended that the 
minimum equity stake for an investment to qualify as direct should be 10%.  
 
Another difficulty is to specify the components included in FDI measurement. The 
following components should be used in FDI when reporting to the IMF: i. Equity 
capital: the value of the initial investment. ii. Reinvested earnings: all earnings of the 
affiliate company that are reinvested in the initial investment. iii. Other capital: the 
transfer pricing between the mother company and the affiliate (short- and long-term 
capital) (Barrell and Pain, 1997, p.64).  
 
A problem arises because many countries leave out of their records at least one or two of 
those components. “The reinvested earnings component of FDI is particularly 
problematic. It is the most difficult component to measure because the data are not 
collected from foreign exchange records, but are based on surveys of the firm” (Brewer, 
1994, p.117). Consequently, this component is left out in many national FDI records. 
Thus, a problem is the structure of FDI, which is differently treated in the practice. 
Although IMF (1993) stipulates that the direct investment capital transaction includes 
equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital as its components, Bitzenis (2006) 
writes that many countries do not record all of them in their FDI statistics. This, as a 
direct consequence, often impedes correct comparisons of the FDI inflows among 
countries. 
  
As outlined by Bitzenis (2008), and Bitzenis and Szamosi (2005), the 
obstacles/constraints of FDI can be categorized according to their source of creation into 
the following groups:   
 
•  Country/geographical/location constraints (geographical distance from the West, 
lack of raw materials/natural resources, high crime rate (also high economic 
crime), social instability, lack of security, absence of tourist opportunities (sea, 
mountains, landscapes, climate), etc.) 
 
•  Business environmental (market) constraints (bureaucracy, corruption, briberies, 
lack of entrepreneurship, lack of managerial skills, lack of skilled labour force, 
high competition, problems in co-operation with locals (problematic joint 
ventures), social instability (strikes), technological backwardness, low labor 
productivity, etc.) 
 
•  Legal constraints (unstable legal framework, constant changes of laws, lack of 
laws, uncertain or imprecise property rights, lack of enforcement of the laws, 
discrimination in the enforcement of the laws, etc.) 
 
•  Taxation constraints (high taxation, high VAT, constraints regarding the 
repatriation of profits, etc.) 
   6
•  Political/government constraints (political and government instability, high 
government intervention, blockage of fund transfers, takeover, slow pace / 
progress in the transition, government inability and government unwillingness for 
successful reforms, etc.) 
 
•  Macroeconomic constraints (exchange rate volatility, high inflation, low per 
capita income, etc.) 
 
•  Infrastructure constraints (technological backwardness, lack of infrastructure 
(telecommunications, roads, networks, internet), lack of financial intermediaries, 
etc.) 
 
•  Cultural constraints (business mentality of local people is unknown, cultural 
consideration constraints, people are against foreign investors, privatization, 
consumption, and against foreign products, etc.) 
 
•  Religion constraints (Indian people do not eat cows, Muslims do not eat pork, 
Muslims do not ask for loans (because of interest rates) 
 
•  Environmental constraints (environmental constraints can be legal constraints that 
determine specific functions of production (e.g. health and safety - product safety 
laws); social constraints that determine the tastes and buying patterns of 
consumers (e.g. healthy foods); ecological constraints that determine the 
necessary conditions of avoiding aspects of pollution) 
 
•  External constraints (war, domino effect of an economic crisis, etc.) 
 
•  Others (lack of future prospects for market/economic growth, disintegrated 
economy, lack of participation in regional initiatives, in international 
organizations and Unions (such as IMF, OECD, NATO, EU, EMU, lack of 
favorable bilateral treaties, lack of financial incentives, etc.) 
 
One of the most important factors a company considers before undertaking FDI is 
minimizing investment risk. When a country has an unstable legal system (i.e., 
regulations change often), lacks appropriate laws, and insufficiently enforces the ones it 
does have, then the risk increases.  From the economical point of view, if the exchange 
rate is volatile and the country suffers macroeconomic instability (inflation), and from the 
political point of view, if the country suffers from political instability or social instability 
(e.g., high labour unrest and strikes), the risk of investing in this country is also increased. 
Especially in transition economies in Central and East European region and in South-East 
Asia when the transition process is delayed (unclear property rights, delay in restitution 
problem, low progress in privatization, in banking reform, in liberalization, existence of 
mafia, nomenclature, corruption, briberies, bureaucracy, etc.), then the economic and 
political instability is enforced and the risk again increases. Moreover, a significant 
number of investors observe that recent financial crises have highlighted the underlying 
risks of investing in emerging and transition markets and there is a need for paying   7
greater attention to issues relating to political and macroeconomic stability, the legal 
framework, corruption and bureaucracy (Bitzenis 2004; Holland et al, 2000; Jun and 
Singh, 1996; Lankes and Venables, 1997). 
 
From an empirical point of view, Holland et al (2000) concluded that econometric 
evidence supports the findings of survey studies and they also added that taken 
individually, certain research may suggest misleading conclusions. They claim for 
example, that a study in Central and Eastern Europe that excludes Hungary and the Czech 
Republic may conclude that political and economic stability is not a very important issue 
to investors. A study, however, that does include Hungary and the Czech Republic may 
indicate that their relative political and economic stability can help explain why such a 
large share of investment in the transition economies has been directed towards these two 
countries. This rationale would also support the notion, however, that, in order to 
minimize potential biases, multi-country FDI studies need to take into account 
similarities in country development, stability, and market size as well as comparable 
sample sizes from the countries included.   
 
According to Holland and Pain (1999), the risk perception is likely to affect the selection 
of an investment site. Bevan and Estrin (2000) claim that “studies on FDI in emerging 
markets” have emphasised the importance of the “economic and political risk”, measured 
by macro-economic, institutional and political stability (p.8). The private sector share of 
GDP, denoting the pace and method of privatisation, proved to affect FDI pattern 
(Lansbury et al., 1996, p.111). Similarly, Carstensen and Toubal (2003) confirmed that 
the level and method of privatisation and the country risk have strong influence on FDI 
attraction. As expected, Merlevede and Schoors (2004) and Holland and Pain (1999) 
found that direct sales stimulate and insider privatisation reduces the foreign investment.  
 
Janicki and Wunnava (2004), using the Institutional Investor country risk rating, provided 
evidence that higher risk reduces the FDI receipts. Kinoshita and Campos (2003) 
provided evidence that rule of law and quality of bureaucracy, are significant FDI drivers. 
On the other hand, the FDI restrictions were found to be efficient barrier to FDI inflows. 
The analysis of Baniak et al. (2002) showed that stable macroeconomic performances and 
legal system exert stimulating influence on FDI inflows, and that instable host country 
environment may lead to “adverse selection of investors”, meaning that it would 
primarily attract “short-run speculative” foreign capital (p.17).
4 
 
The results obtained by Garibaldi et al. (2001) confirmed the positive relationship 
between FDI and macroeconomic stability, level of economic and trade liberalization, 
and fixed exchange rate policy. As expected, the legal barriers and insider privatisation 
reduce the FDI inflows (p.129). Surprisingly, the market perception variable
5 had 
substantial significance, because, as suggested, might have substituted the missing piece 
in information mosaic at the moment of investment decision (p.132). 
 
                                                 
4 Have developed a model focusing on two random variables (exchange rate and marginal production costs) 
in order to test the legal and macroeconomic stability as FDI determinants (p.2-3). 
5 Euromoney bi-annual country-risk ratings.   8
Tondel’s results (2001) proved that FDI inflows are driven by the transition progress (the 
transition index being the only significant variable). The author claimed that higher risk 
sensitivity suggests “a role for the efficiency seeking or vertical investments”. Bevan and 
Estrin (2000) provided evidence that private sector share of GDP is of high significance 
and hence suggested that this is a “...key factor in determining perceived country risk”. 
Also, higher industrialization, direct sales privatisation, lower government deficits and 
increased reserve stocks all improve country credit rating. As expected, the corruption 
indicator had a significant and negative value (p.19). The study of Holland and Pain 
(1999) showed that the risk indicator
6 and FDI were negatively correlated. 
 
03. Research Design 
 
3.1. Modeling ‘Quality of Direct Foreign Investments’ 
 
To investigate the barriers to quality of direct foreign investments, we start by defining 
the quality of FDI. We assume that the quality of direct foreign investments in marked by 
three factors namely, the FDI inflows into the country, levels of volatility in FDI inflows 
which the country is experiencing and number of investment treaties which pave way for 
higher inflows of FDI in the future. Thus, we believe that Quality of FDI = f (Increase in 
FDI Inflows, Decline in Volatility in FDI inflows and Number of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties). Based on this, we decided to run three different models relating to one each to 
see the effects of barriers on quality of FDI.  
 
In the first model related to FDI inflows, the typical dependent variables in the studies of 
determinants of FDI inflows either in single country time series or cross section time 
series studies, it is usually the level of FDI inflows into a country in each year. To control 
for linear trend, some prefer FDI as percentage of GDP. However, we consider neither of 
them for the present study because of one major drawback with these variables. We feel 
that FDI inflows or FDI/GDP is a better indicator for a single country time series but not 
for the study like ours as it does not take into consideration the size of the country. 
Therefore, to control for the size of country, we divide the total volume of FDI inflows of 
each country by their population size. This is our dependent variable for the first model 
on FDI Inflows. This is followed by the second model which deals with volatility in FDI 
inflows. Here, we introduce actual FDI inflows instead of percapita FDI inflows to 
capture for the trend and levels of FDI inflows in the last five years to arrive at volatility 
figures. Finally, the third models deals with number of bilateral investment treaties, 
which captures the total number of bilateral investment treaties which each country 
signed in each year. One must note that due to non availability of the data we could not 
consider the number of agreements ratified.  Thus, the model for quality of FDI can be 
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6 Risk indicator was constructed from GDP growth, consumer price inflation, EBRD Transition Indicator 
and the reserve cover ratio.   9
Where, Q is the Quality of Direct Foreign Investments, which includes all the three 
dependent variables namely, Percapita FDI inflows, Volatility in FDI inflows and 
Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties. We have vector of key independent variables 
set represented by ‘X’, followed by other control variables ‘Z’ and ‘ψ’ is the 
corresponding vectors of coefficients. We have “t” as number of years and “i” as total 
number of sample countries and “η” is the error term. 
 
We have the second equation related to volatility in FDI inflows which requires 
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Thus, the volatility in actual FDI inflows in the current year (Vti) is the standard deviation 
of actual FDI inflows in the t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-5 years.  
 
This empirical analysis covers about 17 countries (five South Asian, five East Asian and 
seven South-East Asian countries) for the period 1996 to 2005. The pooled time-series 
cross-sectional (TCSC) data may exhibit heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
problems. While these problems do not bias the estimated coefficients as pooled 
regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for large sample consisting of cross 
section and time series data. However, they often tend to cause biased standard errors for 
coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To deal with these problems, we 
estimated for all the models the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered over 
countries. These estimated standard errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and to a 
general type of serial correlation within the cross-section unit (Rogers, 1993 and 
Williams, 2000).  
 
The annual data for all the countries from 1996 to 2005 for FDI inflows comes from the 
database on FDI of United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
The population data was taken from World Bank’s World Development Series 2006 to 
arrive at Percapita FDI inflows. We also depend on the same source to trace back the past 
five years FDI inflows to compute volatility in FDI inflows. The bilateral investment 
treaties were also adapted from the same source from the section ‘International Finance 
Database’. 
 
3.2. Key Independent Variables 
 
There are several sets of variables which act as barriers to the quality of direct foreign 
investment. As discussed earlier, we first construct the set of variables that measure the 
labour related issues. They include unionized labour and number of strikes and lockouts. 
We believe that higher the membership of the union, stronger would be the labour union. 
The findings of Cooke W.N. (2006) give us boost on this point. He found that US MNCs 
invest less in those countries where there is higher union membership and contract 
coverage. We also believe that higher union membership is a resultant of liberal labour   10
regulations and thus can have a direct effect of the intensity of strikes and lockouts. This 
argument is well supported by the study conducted by Nidhiya M and Sanyal P (2004) 
that labor unrest, proxied by number of strikes and lockouts and number of mandays lost 
in strikes and lockouts is highly endogenous across all the states of India, and has a 
strong negative impact on foreign investment. Similarly, Aggarwal A (2004) suggest that 
rigid labour markets (includes number of strikes and lockouts, number of man days lost) 
discourage FDI in 25 Indian states. We consider the PSR Group’s data for unionized 
labour which is published in the country reports every year, while the data related to 
strikes and lockouts are adopted from International Labour Organization (ILO) database.  
 
Focusing on the set of policy variables, we introduce capital account convertibility 
dummy, which takes into account the value “0” for the years in which there was no 
convertibility on capital account front and “1” otherwise. The study by Asiedu E and 
Lien D (2004) suggest that the impact of capital controls on FDI varies by region and has 
changed over time. We agree with their view point as many economies in South East 
Asia starting from India to Bangladesh have made some forward movements to remove 
the restrictions on capital account. Our next variable which is largely related to the policy 
aspect is the economic crisis. East Asian economies and most of economies in Pacific 
Rim have suffered during the period 1996 to 1998. However, one must keep in mind that 
in all the countries which were affected by crisis saw negative inflows largely in portfolio 
investments. This however had its drastic impact on attracting FDI too as the inflows in 
these crisis hit economies saw a decline during this period. Hsieh WJ (2005) estimates 
the determinants of FDI for all the East Asian economies and found that the economic 
crisis has a major negative impact on FDI inflows in the countries. We construct the data 
for economic crisis for all the East Asian economies and take the value “1” for the years 
of crisis from 1996 to 1998 and “0” for rest of the years. We do not take into account the 
South Asian economies namely, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh. As a major 
potential economic risk as a barrier, we decided to capture the potential macroeconomic 
risk of an economy based on key monetary, fiscal, external, structural risk elements. This 
includes the size of current account deficit and fiscal deficit, inflation, unemployment 
rate, exchange rate stability and lending rates. A country’s overall score is arrived from 
multiplying the weights assigned to each variable
7 with the value of the indicator. Thus, it 
is a simple weighted average index and arguably a crude way of gauging the potential 
risk. But, one must note that it reflects the key macroeconomic factors which have really 
caused trouble for the economy in those sample periods. For example, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Korea experienced negative value in the index between the period 1996 
and 1998, suggesting the potential risk is high. Following the method of Joseph P.H et al. 
(2007) we capture the track record of the governments as an important policy barrier. We 
assume that the poor track record of the government acts as a disincentive to attract FDI.  
To capture the track record of the government we calculate the standard deviation of 
GDP growth rate for the past five years. Higher values meaning, higher volatility and 
poor track record of the government. We believe that higher values are an indicator 
towards unstable economic growth which is a resultant of past government policies and 
                                                 
7 We divided the total weight of 100 into 7 equal parts and assigned each indicator a weight of 14.28571 to 
be super precise.    11
its impact on quality of FDI is bound to be negative. We adopted the GDP growth rates 
for the countries from Asian Development Bank’s Macroeconomic indicators 2006. 
 
We now pick the set of institutional variables starting with the political regime. There is 
vast literature which contradicts the findings related to democracy and autocracy regimes 
in attracting higher levels of FDI. We have in our sample as many as four autocratic and 
seven partial democratic and six full democratic countries. Therefore, we would like to 
re-test this aspect of implications of type of political regime acting as barrier towards 
quality of FDI. Similarly, we assume that FDI inflows in developing and emerging 
economies are sensitive towards the political instability as it can lead to change in 
economic policies led by a totally new government. In the study conducted by Fatehi and 
Safizadeh (1990) cover a range of surveys which show that MNCs in host country give 
utmost importance towards political stability factor in deciding to invest in a project. We 
take the Polity IV scores which range between -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy) 
for political regime. Whenever we see a drop in the Polity IV score by one basis point, 
we consider that year as internal political instability. We give coding for this as “1” and 
“0” otherwise. We also take into account the perceived values of corruption in each 
country as important barrier. We could not get the actual corruption scores which are 
indeed published by some of the research institutes lie PSR Group, CSN Network to 
name a few. Hence we had to consider the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), which shows whether the country is making an improvement in 
the controlling for corruption. The ratings are given on a scale of 0 to 10, while 0 being 
no control in corruption levels, while 10 being maximum control over corruption levels in 
the country. Robertson and Watson (2004) in their study using the same indicators as we 
used, CPI, have found that infact increase in corruption levels is highly associated with 
rapid growth in FDI inflows. In an another study by Habib and Leon (2006) find that 
MNCs usually avoid the countries where the corruption levels are high as it creates 
operational inefficiencies, while in the work of Egger and Winner (2005) using a sample 
of 73 countries found a very clear and strong positive association of corruption levels 
with FDI inflows. These studies from the literature show how divided the research is on 
relationship between corruption levels and FDI inflows. Under this backdrop, we are 
interested to know whether corruption acts as barrier or otherwise towards quality of FDI 
in South East Asia which includes many countries in which corruption levels are 
rampant, including India. Lastly, we also include the most important institutional 
variable, Civil Liberties. We believe that foreign investors attach importance to civil 
liberties as it includes issues not only related to the state like rule of law, but also includes 
issues directly related to business. Freedom to business and cooperation is one of the key 
components of civil liberties and so do is the liberal labour issues like union membership. 
 
We are also interested to see if poor socioeconomic conditions of the state can also 
indirectly discourage the direct foreign investments. Therefore, to capture this affect, 
depending upon the availability of the data, we introduce two variables which better 
represent the socio economic conditions. They include literacy rates and infant deaths.  In 
a study by Görg et al. (2007) found a strong support for the conjecture that redistributive 
social welfare state policies are valued by multinationals, because they signal a 
government’s commitment to social stability. Going by this argument, we feel that it is   12
very important to see whether the poor socioeconomic condition in these emerging 
economies is anyway hindering the quality of FDI. Meaning, are FDI inflows sensitive 
towards poor socio-economics conditions in developing countries? The data for the both 
the variables were adapted from the statistical year books of the countries published by 
PSR Group. 
 
We now move on towards other control variables introduced in the three models. South 
East Asia has a history of internal conflicts and to a very lesser degree the external 
conflict. In the past, there were wars waged between India and China in 1962, India and 
Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and in 1971 and India and Bangladesh in 1971. However, in the 
recent times, there were no major external conflicts either in East Asia or in South Asia 
excepting the Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1998. We capture this effect by 
introducing a dummy value “1” for the year in which there was an external conflict and 
“0” otherwise. The process is similar for the presence of internal conflict. We have major 
internal state conflict in the countries like Sri Lanka and Pakistan and to a lesser degree in 
India, Burma, Indonesia and Philippines. These dummy values are created based on the 
information about internal wars published by State Task Force Report (2005). It was 
argued by Vadlamnnati KC & Tamazian A (2006) by taking the case of Sri Lanka, that 
internal state conflict affects the FDI attractiveness and actual inflows. Extending the 
study further by Vadlamannati KC (2007) the findings show that internal conflict not 
only affects the FDI attractiveness and inflows, but also deters the quality, growth rate 
and increases the volatility. Further, it was also found that internal conflict actually leads 
to drifting away of FDI inflows to the neighboring countries due to the presence of 
conflict in the host country.  
 
The last two control variables include: bilateral taxation treaties and regional association 
membership. It is been proved by the past studies that indeed taxation treaties really help 
in boosting FDI inflows in the host country Blonigen and Davis (2000). We secured the 
data related to bilateral taxation treaties from the database published by UNCTAD. We 
also wanted to test whether the association memberships of the countries included in our 
sample is leading to increase in quality of FDI. We have three sets of association group 
countries in the study. They include: SAARC, ASEAN and OECD
8. Therefore, we 
introduced dummy variable which takes the value as “1” if the country is not a member 
of any association and “0” otherwise. What are the expected signs of the five group sets 
of variables? Based on our arguments earlier and the theme of the paper, we should 
                                                 
8 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on December 8, 1985. 
Its member states consist of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. A 
regional cooperation organization including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka, founded in 1985. Objectives include establishment of a preferential trade area by 1997; the draft 
text of a South Asia Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPT A) is under negotiation. In 1967 an association 
called ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) formed initially with five member nations 
namely, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Philippines. Later Brunei (1983), Viet Nam (1994) 
Myanmar, Lao (1999) Cambodia (2002) joined ASEAN. They have ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA) by the member nations of ASEAN signed in 1992 for free trade and investments activities. In 1961 
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was replaced by OECD which is an 
international organization composed of the industrialized market economy countries, as well as some 
developing countries, by providing a forum in which to establish and coordinate policies. Japan and South 
Korea are the members of OECD.   13
effectively have negative signs for the large number of these variables (See Exhibit 1). As 
noted, the coefficients of the variables are expected to be largely negative. However, 
there are some coefficients whose signs cannot be expected precisely because some of the 
countries have had a positive effect of them and while other had negative effect. 
Therefore, it is not possible to accurately expect the signs of them.  
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Labour Barriers: 
 
i.  Unionized  Labour       Negative 
 




i.  Capital Account Convertibility        ? 
 
ii.  P M E R I         ? 
 
iii.  Economic  Crisis       Negative 
 
iv.  Track Record of the Government       ? 
 




i.  Literacy  Rate       Negative 
 




i.  Political  Regime       Negative  
 
ii.  Political  Instability     Negative 
 
iii.  Civil  Liberties       Negative 
 




i.  Bilateral Taxation Treaties        Positive 
 
ii.  Internal & External Conflicts        Negative 
 
iii.  Association  Membership      Positive 
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04. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
This section presents the results of regression estimates in measuring the influence of 
various sets of barriers to direct foreign investment inflows, volatility, expected volatility 
and actual inflows. Each model consists of one standard model followed by other models, 
checking for robustness of the results. The table – 1 captures the regression estimates for 
percapita FDI inflows. The estimates of the regression results for volatility in actual FDI 
inflows are presented in table – 2. This is followed by the results of bilateral investment 
treaties in tables 3. Important statistics are presented at the end of each table. All the 
results include white Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance to 
counter the problem of Heteroskedasticity.  
 
We begin with model – 1, the results provide the first impression about the relationship 
between various types of barriers to FDI in South East Asian economies. The labour 
related variables are considered to be key opponents of the globalization process, we find 
both unionized labour and number of strikes and lockouts have a significant negative 
effect of FDI inflows in these countries. We also find that the effect of former is more 
compared to the later (see coefficient values). Higher the unionized labour, lower the 
attractiveness for FDI inflows into the country. This is statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level. Though we agree that unionized labour by itself does not mean a strong 
representation of the workers’ interests, but it definitely reflects the strength of the labour 
union in respective countries. This is well supported by the fact that there has been 
increasing number of strikes and lockouts in which labour union plays a key role. The 
strikes and lockouts, which is negative and is statistically significant at 5% confidence 
only proves this point. Added to this, the research findings of Greider (1998) show that 
the effect of political repression on FDI inflows is largely due to curtailment of workers 
rights and cutting down the union representation. We carry forward this discussion in 
model 1B and 1C further. 
 
Table -1: Results of Barriers to Percapita FDI inflows equation 
 





Model  1A  Model  1B  Model  1C  Model  1D  Model  1E 



















---- -19.527  * 
(5.7967) 
---- -19.485  * 
(5.8014) 

















































Track Record of Government 
83.410 * 
(31.743) 




































































































---- ---- ---- 
Labour Effectiveness I  ----  ----  -54.396 * 
(11.095) 
---- ---- ---- 
Labour Efficiency I  ----  ----  ----  -1.3471 * 
(0.4776) 
---- ---- 
Labour Effectiveness II  ----  ----  ----  ----  -6.2349 * 
(1.0232) 
---- 
Labour Efficiency II  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  -0.0926 * 
(0.0322) 
             
 
R-squared  0.672760  0.669573  0.689656  0.670767 0.692180 0.670681 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.645490  0.638670  0.665935  0.645603 0.668653 0.645510 
Log likelihood          -1352.833  -1358.572 
F-statistic         29.41988  26.64511 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total nobs.  170 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
We now move to the socio-economic factors which are represented by literacy rates and 
infant deaths. Human capital is the most important factor in attracting FDI inflows into a 
country (Blomström & Kokko, 2003 and Farhad, Alberto & Ali. Y 2001). The literacy rate 
is one of the key variables which can better represent the levels of human capital in any 
country. One must note that all the South Asian economies excluding Sri Lanka have 
lower levels of literacy rates. Added to that, the number of infant deaths in all the 
countries excluding Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore are much higher. Perhaps 
this is the reason why both these variables share a negative influence over FDI inflows. 
However, the relationship between infant deaths and percapita FDI inflows is weak, but 
has expected negative sign. The statistical significance of literacy rates is much higher 
with 5% confidence level.  
 
The results related to policy variables are a mixed bag. We find that the capital account 
convertibility has a very strong positive association with percapita FDI inflows. This is   16
statistically significant 1% confidence level. The countries which are fully liberal on 
capital account front are only, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia and Japan, but there are 
efforts being made by other countries in the region to slowly, but partially liberalize the 
capital account.  
 
The track record of the government largely depends on the government polices which is 
reflected interms of economic growth and its volatility over the years, shows a strong 
positive effect on percapita FDI inflows in this region. This is statistically significant at 
1% confidence level. One must agree that the volatility in GDP growth in most of the 
South East Asian countries from 1996 is relatively lower. There is a surge in economic 
growth in this region, which is recoded at over 6.5% in 2005 and is expected to grow at 
same pace in the next two years (Asian Development Bank Report, 2006). This suggests 
obviously that the economic policies are better reflected on economic growth giving 
encouraging signs to attract FDI inflows. Moving ahead, most of the East Asian 
economies suffered with economic crisis during the period 1996 to 1998. Most of them 
saw lower amounts of FDI inflows, depreciation of currencies and large amount of public 
debt. Though large section of South Asian economies like India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
have not witnessed acute crisis, but had slightest of the impact interms of decline in FDI 
inflows during this period. We thus, find a negative association of economic crisis with 
percapita FDI inflows. The relationship is robust and is statistically significant at 5% 
confidence level.  The other important policy variable which we tried to capture is the 
Potential Macro Economic Risk Index (PMERI). This captures wide range of policy 
variables starting with policies related to fiscal, monetary, external and structural fronts. 
The results show that the coefficient of PMERI is not statistically significant. The results 
are not surprising because, this is consistent what we have found earlier related overall 
economic policy interms of track record of the government. We found track record of the 
government to be positively associated with percapita FDI inflows. This nullifies the fact 
that there is a danger of potential economic risk in the years to come. A higher value of 
PMERI suggests the economy being on safer side. When we look at the PMERI index for 
the sample of South East Asia, we find that the almost all the countries barring Pakistan 
and Vietnam which are having values lower than 1.5 basis points, are well above the 
potential risk. 
 
Before we move to other sub-models, it is worthwhile to consider the most important set 
of variables related to institutions and their quality. We rather surprisingly found that the 
levels of corruptions in these countries which are at very high levels are actually 
encouraging FDI inflows. We find a very strong positive association of perceived 
corruption levels with percapita FDI inflows. This is statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level. One reason for this perhaps could be that the foreign firms and other 
MNCs are required to lobby hard to get the things done which are related and could affect 
their business operations and they end up involving in corruption at the bureaucratic level 
(Robertson and Watson, 2004). The other reason for this could be that there is an overall 
improvement in the perceived corruption levels in these countries. The total average 
value of the perceived corruption levels for entire sample during the period 1996 to 2005 
is 3.95, while the average value of all South Asian economies is around 2.56 and for East 
Asia it is around 4.35, which is though low, but are showing signs of improvement. There   17
is improvement in perceived corruption level scores for almost all the countries in the 
sample from the year 1996. However, countries like Burma, Indonesia, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan are the matter of concerned as we see a fall in the perceived corruption level 
scores for Bangladesh, Pakistan and Burma and a very slow progress in the case of 
Indonesia. 
 
Coming to political factors, we argue that both extreme political regime and political 
instability deter in attracting FDI inflows. One must note that there is a large section of 
contradicting literature related to the relationship between political regime and FDI 
inflows. There is increasing amount of literature which shows that FDI would react 
positively towards the democratic regimes (Goldsmith, 1995; Held & McGrew 2000; 
Harms & Henrich, 2002; Angles M et al., 2002; Busse, 2003; de Syosa, 2003; Nathan M. 
Jensen, 2003; Jakobsen and Soysa, 2006). However, the argument that FDI flows more 
into democratic setup is purely mixed in the literature. There are also studies which have 
found that autocracies indeed are preferred by FDI (Huntigton & Dominguez, 1975, 
O’Donnell, 1988, Li and Resnick, 2002; Guerin and Manzocchib, 2007). Having shown 
these many works, we do not disagree with their findings. But, we rather would take the 
middle path and base our argument on the fact that partial democracies (which are neither 
fully democrats nor fully autocrats) actually acts as disincentive for foreign investors. In 
partial democracies, we find that the decision making policies are slow, institutions are 
weak and face higher threats of political instability not only deter FDI inflows, but are 
also suffer economically. This is extensively proved with a highly large sample study 
conducted by Hegre, Gates, et al., (2001). When we look at our sample of 17 countries, 
we find that four countries are extremely autocratic
9 and as many as five countries are 
partially democrats
10. The interesting fact of the matter is none of the above mentioned 
autocrats, barring Burma have ever experienced economic and / or political turmoil. But, 
almost all the partial democracies listed above have witnessed wide range of problems 
related to economic and political instability. Therefore, we argue that partial democracies 
to a large extent and full autocracies to a minor extent deter attracting FDI inflows
11. 
Thus, we find a very strong negative relationship between political regime and percapita 
FDI inflows which is statistically significant at 10% confidence level. We also find 
negative association of political instability with percapita FDI inflows. Though the 
coefficient is very strong, the relationship is quite weak with 15% confidence level. As 
we have good number of partial democracies in our sample leading to political 
instabilities in these countries. This acts as a major deterring force interms of attractive 
FDI inflows as it leads to increase in probability of changes in major economic policies 
by the new government.  
 
                                                 
9 They include: China, Burma, Vietnam and Hong Kong.  
10 They include: Sri Lanka, Singapore, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia. Though, South Korea was 
under partial Democracy till 1997, made transition to full democracy from then on. 
11 We use the term “minor extent” to full autocracies because they deter both civil and political liberties, 
which are highly weighted by the foreign investors. Having said that, we have exceptions like China and 
Hong Kong as special cases wherein, the scores related to very low political and civil liberties haven’t 
changed in that 10 years beginning with early 1990s. But, we assume them to be special cases because of 
the additional resource advantage these economies possess like cheap labour cost, which is a resultant of 
government acting as “cost absorber” and abundant and growing market size.      18
One of the other interesting findings of the study includes that of Civil Liberties. We find 
that it is negative and has a very high coefficient in absolute value and is statistically 
significant at 10% confidence level. The interesting observation is between the 
comparison between the results of civil liberties and political regime. On comparison, we 
find that both are statistically significant at 10% confidence level. But the coefficient of 
civil liberties is more than twice than that of political regime. This means that foreign 
investors though consider both political regime and civil liberties as important, give 
slightly higher preference to civil liberties. This is simply because civil liberties include 
the important clause of “freedom to business firms”. Thus, foreign investors are attracted 
by those regimes which give higher importance to freedom of business and then followed 
by other political factors like regime and regime change.  
 
Lastly, we come towards the conflict variable, which strangely has a positive association 
with FDI inflows. The value of coefficient is very strong and is statistically significant at 
1% confidence level. The one obvious reason could be that there are no major conflicts 
either external or internal in this region, barring Sri Lanka and minor conflicts in India, 
Indonesia and Philippines. During the whole sample period there was only one external 
conflict, between India and Pakistan in 1998 popularly known as Kargil war.  
 
We now turn towards the specification of the empirical model which takes into account 
other factors which are very relevant to our study. The model 1A presents the track 
record of the government in lagged value. We name this as ‘expected track record of the 
government’. This is because the past year’s track record of the government very much 
helps in determining the current year’s performance. We find that the expected track 
record of the government like in the current year is expected to have a positive impact on 
the percapita FDI inflows. This is statistically significant at 5% confidence level. But the 
coefficient value has come down from 83.41 to 71.48, suggesting decline in confidence 
perhaps due to future uncertainty. But nevertheless, the association is still very strong. 
The other thing which should be noticed is that, with the introduction of this variable, the 
results which were presented in the previous model 1 haven’t changed greatly, infact 
most have them have improved their coefficient values slightly. 
 
We now bring back the debate on the unionized labour and its degree of membership and 
representation. We argued that union membership and strikes and lockouts are strongly 
associated in reducing the attractiveness of FDI into the country. But, the major 
hindrance to our finding is caused by the fact that our sample also includes countries 
which are fully autocrat like China, Hong Kong, Burma and Vietnam. It is argued by the 
experts like Harms & Ursprung (2002) that in repressive regimes, labour unions control 
workers to enforce the government’s decisions. To account for this effect, we introduced 
four new variables in interaction terms
12 which include: i. Effective labour union I & II, 
ii. Efficiency of labour union I & II.   
 
                                                 
12 Two of those four interactive terms are proposed by Harms & Ursprung (2004) themselves. We use their 
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This helps in understanding the how effective the labour unions are in all the three types 
of regimes, viz., full democratic, fully autocratic and partly democratic, because, one of 
the other important components of civil liberties is the existence of free trade unions. We 
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We take this into account because we feel that higher the existence of freedom for trade 
unions, higher the chances for strikes and lockouts, which inturn is a measure for the 
other side of the coin of unionized labour. Apart from this, we also include other 
variables which act as another set of proxy for Labour Effectiveness and Efficiency: 
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With these four sets of variables acting as proxy for labour effectiveness and efficiency, 
we introduce them separately in each model viz., model 1B, 1C and 1D. We find that in 
all the four models, these variables show a negative signs. In the model 1B we find that 
labour effectiveness - I has a very strong negative association with percapita FDI inflows 
and is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. The Interesting point to be noted 
here is that when the labour effectiveness - I is introduced, we find that the coefficient 
value of this variable is much higher, almost double than the simple ‘labour unionized’ 
variable, proving that indeed that the higher effectiveness of the labour unionism acts as 
the disincentive to attract FDI inflows. Same is true in the case of model 1B in which we 
introduce efficiency of labour union only to find a negative association which is 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level. Here also, we find that the coefficient 
value of this variable is much higher than the ‘strikes and lockout’ variable, suggesting 
the efficiency of labour unionism is very strong and it helps in deterring FDI inflows into 
the country. To crosscheck our analysis, we once again test for labour effectiveness and 
efficiency, this time with different approach, but considering civil liberties into account. 
We still find that both labour effectiveness II and labour efficiency II holding negative 
signs with statistical significance at 1% confidence level. This proves the point that 
liberal labour workforce is indeed not helpful in attracting FDI inflows. The data of our 
sample of 17 countries also proves this point as we find absence of labour union of any 
form only in China and Vietnam and in rest of the countries in our sample the labour 
union is very much present and active. 
   20
We now proceed ahead with our next model, which takes into consideration the cross 
section time series of Volatility of actual FDI inflows for the sample. The results in table 
2 show most interesting findings are that all the variables which are negatively associated 
with Percapita FDI inflows in the previous models have now turned positive. This means 
that they indeed are leading to volatility in actual FD inflows. We find that both 
unionized labour and strikes and lockouts are not only positively associated but are also 
statistically significant at 10% confidence level. This only suggests that any aggravation 
in free labour union leading to extreme strikes and lockouts might lead to creating 
uncertainty in FDI inflows. We also find both the socio-economic variables sharing a 
positive relationship which is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. This means 
poor human capital arising out of vulnerable socioeconomic condition might also lead to 
uncertainty in the inflows of FDI.  
 
Table 2: Results of Volatility in FDI inflows equation 
 





Model  2A  Model  2B  Model  2C  Model  2D  Model  2E 



















---- 0.0208  *** 
(0.0120) 
---- 0.0204  *** 
(0.0120) 
















































































































































Expected Track Record of 
Government (t-1) 
---- 0.1838  * 
(0.0325) 
----  ---- ---- ---- 
Labour Effectiveness I  ----  ----  0.0189 +  ----  ----  ----   21
(0.0150) 
Labour Efficiency I  ----  ----  ----  0.0011 + 
(0.0008) 
---- ---- 
Labour Effectiveness II  ----  ----  ----  ----  0.0025 + 
(0.0018) 
---- 
Labour Efficiency II  ----  ---- ----  ----  ---- 9.72E-  *** 
(5.70E-) 
             
 





Adjusted R-squared  0.312494  0.386979  0.386979  0.310877  0.307769  0.313393 
F-statistic 6.734113  7.16E-12  5.25E-10  2.83E-10  7.076275  7.237980 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Total nobs.  170 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
We now turn towards the policy variables which provide mixed results. We find that 
capital account convertibility efforts are still long way to go to reduce the volatility in 
foreign capital inflows. However, we could see that this relationship is strong, suggesting 
that indeed more steps should be taken to liberalize the capital account. The statistical 
significance of 1% attaches authentication to this argument. Though the track record of 
the government might be leading to increase in percapita FDI inflows, but is certainly 
leading to volatility in FDI inflows. This is statistically significant at 1% confidence 
level. This only suggests that there is clearly a further scope to improve the track record 
of the government and bring down the volatility in economic growth to stabilize the FDI 
inflows. We find that PMERI having no statistical significance towards the volatility in 
FDI inflows to only confirm with the consistent result obtained in the previous model that 
there is no great potential macro economic risk which can actually threaten the 
interruption of FDI in these economies. But, the interesting finding which contradicts the 
earlier finding is that of economic crisis. We find that economic crisis variable is actually 
leading to decline in volatility in FDI inflows. The probable reason for this behavior 
could be, one, due to the fact that the sample also includes those economies which are not 
affected by the crisis and two, the crisis period was only three years in the sample of 10 
and we see all the economies recovering substantially after the crisis period and finally, 
the crisis mainly affected the portfolio investments than direct foreign investments. This 
means that all the countries affected by this crisis saw negative portfolio investments, 
suggesting sudden withdrawal by foreign investors. But this was not the case with FDI 
inflows as we could not find any negative FDI inflows. However, we find that there has 
been decline in level of inflow during those three years of crisis.  
 
The institutional variables are largely inline with our previous finding. Both political 
regime and political instability are sharing positive effect on volatility in FDI inflows and 
are statistically significant at 1% and 10% confidence level respectively. But, comparing 
the coefficient values of the both suggests that the later has a more drastic impact on 
volatility than the former. Thus, investors attach a greater importance to instability of the 
government to regime itself. This could be due to change in ruling party of the 
government can lead to change in policies which may or may not be on the expected lines   22
for the foreign investors. The strange finding is that neither civil liberties nor conflict nor 
perceived levels of corruption are having any significant impact on volatility in FDI 
inflows, though they carry expected signs. 
 
In the next step, we introduce lagged value of track record of the government, to capture 
of expected track record of the government in the future based on the previous 
performance. We find that the results do not change in any manner and the statistical 
significance remains intact. This tells us that expected track record of the government 
could as well lead to volatility in FDI inflows. This is because, if we compared the 
coefficient values of track record of the government in the years‘t’ and‘t-1’, we find that 
there is an increase, which shows that expected track record of the government can have a 
negative affect in increasing the volatility in FDI inflows. The results pertaining to other 
variables also do not change drastically.  
 
The model 2B and 2C shows the results of union effectiveness I and union efficiency I. 
We find that the relationship of both the variables with volatility in FDI inflows though 
positive, is infact weak. Both are statistically significant at 15% confidence level. The 
coefficient values of the both in comparison to the standard model 2 have not increase 
drastically. This proves that though the notion of much liberal unionized work force help 
in deterring the FDI inflows do not stand on the strong ground to argue that they would 
indeed lead to volatility in FDI inflows. Like our previous models, we go a step ahead to 
cross check our results by introducing union effectives and efficiency II. We find mixed 
results as both have a positive sign, but union effectiveness II is statistically significant at 
15% confidence level, while union efficiency II is significant at 10% confidence level.  
 
We now divert our attention towards Bilateral Investment Treaties model highlighted in 
table – 3. We include two different models to take into account different permutations 
and combinations. We begin with model 3 which is our standard model. We find that 
capital account convertibility is positively associated with investment treaties between the 
countries. We find that PMERI sharing a negative association with bilateral investment 
treaties, which is in contradiction with our previous models wherein though it shared 
correct sign was not found to be significant. However, in this case, we find that PMERI is 
not significant in the current year but is found negative and significant in‘t-1’ year, which 
means that its effect is felt a year later. We also find the economic crisis has a positive 
association and is statistically significant at 5% confidence level. The data related to 
investment treaties shows that infact during those crisis periods, the number of 
investment treaties have actually gone up. This means the negative impact of economic 
crisis on investment treaties can be ruled out. The last policy variable, track record of the 
government is found to be statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 3: Results of Bilateral Investment Treaties equation 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Variables  Standard Model 3  Model  3A 






Unionized Labour  -0.1224 *  -0.050*   23
(0.0210) (0.014) 















































Association Membership  1.234 * 
(0.4574) 
---- 
Bilateral Double Taxation Treaties (t-1)  ----  0.297 * 
(0.075) 
     
 
R-squared 0.3662  0.3315 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3081  0.2703 
Wald 
2 χ   40.87 41.32 
Prob 0.0001  0.0000 
Hausman 
2 χ    5.25 14.15 
Prob 0.9183  0.1661 
Total nobs.  144                                 144 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Coming to the institutional variable, the results related to political instability is on 
expected lines as we find a negative association with investment treaties. Which means 
higher the political instability lower are the chances towards to entering into investment 
agreements between the countries. Often political instability leads to changes in the 
government, which can alter the economic policy and sometimes the newly elected 
governments may not be in a position to carry forward the bilateral investment talks 
which were initiated by the previous governments. Moving ahead, we find that civil 
liberties is constantly playing a key role to show its negative effect on all the variables 
related to direct foreign investments. This is perhaps due to the curtailment of freedom of 
business and cooperation, which is an integral part of civil liberties concept. The 
improvement in corruption perception indices for almost all the economies in the sample 
is positively associated with investment treaties. The labour issues show mixed results as   24
we find that number of strikes and lockouts having positive sign whereas unionized 
labour bearing negative sign. The later is significant at 15% while the former at 1%. 
Though the number of strikes and lockouts is positive, its coefficient value is lower, 
which tell us that its positive effect is minimal.  
 
Apart from our regular barriers group variables, we have also added two new variables 
into the model, viz., volatility in FDI inflows and regional association membership of 
each country. As expected, both share expected signs with statistical significance of 5% 
and 1% confidence levels respectively. This suggests the regional association 
membership and associations are indeed resulting in increase in bilateral investment 
treaties between the countries and thus paving way for higher FDI inflows.  
 
In the next model 3A, we replace membership variable with another important variable, 
bilateral double taxation treaties by the countries. We find that the bilateral double 
taxation treaties variable is having a significant positive impact on investment treaties 
variable. This is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. However, we find that 
this variable is significant both at current and lagged terms. But, its significance is much 
stronger when considered in lagged values. This means that treaties though might have an 
immediate affect, there is substantial lag before the treaty adoption positively affects the 
bilateral investment agreements.  
 
05. Summary & Conclusion 
 
Although there are several studies which have focused on barriers to FDI, the 
concentration on South and East Asian economies has been low. We offer a new set of 
argument with a holistic approach towards barriers to FDI in South and East Asian 
economies. What is more, the paper explores the term ‘quality of FDI’ which is said to be 
the function of percapita FDI inflows, level of volatility in actual FDI inflows and 
number of bilateral investment treaties. The degree to which these barriers have been 
considered by foreign investors is evaluated, and special attention is given to all sets of 
barriers including poor socioeconomic conditions, policy related issues, institutional 
quality and labour related issues. 
 
The empirical analysis of barriers affecting the quality of FDI in South and East Asian 
economies covers about 17 countries from the time period 1996 to 2005. Our findings 
show that poor socio economic conditions and labour related issues negatively affect the 
quality of FDI. We further tested for effectiveness and efficiency of labour unionism in 
these countries by introducing two different sets of variables. The evidence further 
strengthened our earlier findings that indeed labour related issues are acting as barriers 
towards quality of FDI in South and East Asia. The labour reforms in countries like India, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan are kept on hold due to pressures from various quarters, have to be 
taken up in order to become more attractive investment destination.  
 
These findings are followed by policy and institutional barriers. The evidence related to 
these portrays a mixed picture. Though we find that large number of variables related to 
both the sets to be negative, some of them turned positive. For example, we expected that   25
PMERI to be largely negative in all the models, but was found insignificant for percapita 
FDI and volatility inflows. However, we find it to have a negative effect on the bilateral 
investment treaties. Similarly, we find mixed results for economic crisis variable. This is 
perhaps because the sample also includes those countries which are not affected by the 
crisis and also, though the crisis did have its impact on FDI inflows, the degree of its 
effect in comparison to portfolio investments is lower. 
 
We also found that the Association membership of the countries is infact helping to 
attract FDI inflows and thereby improving the quality of FDI. The evidence also suggests 
that the bilateral double taxation treaties are having its effect on quality of FDI but in 
lagged terms. Meaning, treaties though might have an immediate affect, there is 
substantial lag before the treaty adoption positively affects the quality of FDI.  
 
However, the greatest limitation of our study is that we could not account for the 
administrative barriers which often the foreign investors face in developing economies, 
particularly like the countries in South and East Asia. The one reason why we could not 
account for this factor was there was no exact quantifiable variable which can precisely 
define the administrative and bureaucratic hurdles which the MNEs face while entering 
into a developing economy. Therefore, basing on this study, further research should 
investigate the barriers to quality of FDI by taking into consideration the various types of 
administrative, bureaucratic and regulatory barriers which play a key role most often in 
affecting the decision of a foreign investor to invest in a particular country. Perhaps the 
first step in this process would be to identify key variables which account for the above 
mentioned and the quantifying them by using coding measures and then formulate an 
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